Research

My current research projects focus on consent, promising, and theories of rights.

Below are some of the projects I am currently working on. Please contact me for drafts, questions, or comments!

The Value of Uptake in Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2024)

Arguments for what consent is often appeal to its functions. For instance, some argue that because consent functions to express the consent-giver’s autonomous control over her normative boundaries, consent must consist in a mental state. In this paper I argue that consent has an often overlooked function, and that its having this function has consequences for our views of what consent is. I argue that consent has a relationship-shaping function: acts of consent can alter and enable personal relationships. This function grounds an argument for the following claim: some acts of consent cannot be morally transformative unless there is uptake, or acceptance, or cooperation, on the recipient’s part. That is to say, at least some acts of consent need to be “cosigned” by both parties. This rules out what I call “unilateral” conceptions of consent, according to which consent can be given by the giver alone, and nobody else needs to enter the picture.

[Title redacted] (under review)

A paper on the ontology of consent.

[Title Redacted] (under review)

A paper on sexual promises and the right to refuse sexual contact. 

Mobile Consent & Its Discontents

“Consent applications” are mobile phone applications that can be used to document users’ consent to a sexual encounter. In this paper I argue that this technology fundamentally misrepresents sexual consent by portraying it as a scripted interaction that precedes a sexual encounter. Sexual consent ought to be an ongoing process which lasts throughout the encounter. This shortcoming of the technology gives us a chance to discuss ongoing consent—which is often acknowledged to be important, but remains under-theorised in the philosophical literature—and its importance in some detail. I will also argue that introducing a mobile phone application into sexual relations raises serious concerns about privacy, surveillance, and the effect that such applications may have on young people’s ideas about sexual consent. 

Parasocial Partiality

A paper on the ethics of parasocial relationships and reasons of partiality. 

Wrongs without Rights?

The orthodox view of directed wrongdoing says that to wrong someone just is to violate their rights. This orthodox view has been challenged by recent literature, where several authors have argued that there are wrongs without rights. I concur with these authors, and pose a further question: if directed wrongdoing isn’t just about violating rights, then what is it to wrong someone? In this paper I propose a view of directed wrongdoing which accommodates the cases raised in the literature on wrongs without rights. This view also has an interesting upshot: imperfect duties can occasion directed wrongdoing. 

Are There Any Imperfect Rights?

Imperfect duties pose puzzles for relational ethics. These duties sometimes are owed to particular others, yet they don’t correspond to rights. These duties also sometimes occasion wrongs against particular others, despite not being owed. In this paper I argue that we can solve these puzzles, and explain the relational aspects of imperfect duty, without positing “imperfect rights”.